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1 Introduction: the Risk Perspective 
 
 
World wide aviation data shows an increase in volume in all types of air transportation. 
A representative graph from the Dutch Civil Aviation Safety Data 1989‐2003 [ 34] shows  
the number of flights doubling between 1980 and 2003.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Number of accidents involving a least one fatality within 30 days (red bars) and 
number of flights (x million) (blue line) from 1980 to 2003, for world wide  commercial 
aircraft with take‐off weight of 5700 kg or heavier. 
 
 
The world wide frequency of accidents (number per year) shows no marked trend. 
However, the number of accidents per flight is decreasing, both world wide and for 
European Air Safety Agency countries (see Figure 2). Whereas world wide, the accident 
rate has been deceasing by 2.8% per year, for EASA countries, the fatal accident rate is 
deceasing by 4.9% per year.  
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Figure 1.2:  Fatal accidents (at least on fatality within 30 days) with commercial aviation 
(take off weight 5700 kg or heavier), per million flights, world wide (red) and for EASA 
(blue). 
 
The breakdown in types of accidents shows that controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is the 
dominant accident type. The main causal contributor is “cockpit crew”. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Principal causes of fatal accidents for commercial aviation (take off weight > 
5700kg),  categorized accordint to the International Civil Aviation Organization, 1989‐2003. 
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Figure 1.4: Relative importance of contributing factors to fatal accidents with commercial 
aviation (take off weight > 5700 kg) where a contributing factor is "a decisive factor in the 
causal chain of events leading to a fatal accident”, 1980‐2003. 
 
 
 
The FAA in 2006 [ 33] forecast a 4.4 percent growth rate in civil air transportation 
volume, implying a doubling  in 16 years.  If historical trends continue, this growth in 
volume must be accompanied with a decrease  in the accident rate per flight which is at 
least as great, preferably greater. Hence, designing for increased volume must be 
coupled with designing for decreasing risk.  
 
Given the already very low accident rate for commercial aviation, together with the very 
high complexity the total civil aviation system, many responsible agencies have 
concluded that further improvements in safety would be served by a comprehensive 
system‐wide risk model for civil aviation. This model should enable the disaggregation of 
fatal accidents into their causal components, including, in particular, human error.  
 
The Netherlands ministry of Transport and Water Management has commissioned a project 
for the realization of a causal model to be used for comparing alternatives for strengthening 
safety measures, for finding causes of incidents and accidents and for quantification of the 
probability of adverse events in the aviation system ([ 3],[ 5]). The model is being developed 
by a consortium including Delft University of Technology (TUD), Det Norske Veritas (DNV), 
the National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) and White Queen (WQ). These organizations have 
been involved in the process of building the appropriate tools for the delivery of the model. 
 
EEMCS‐TU Delft  
7
Draft 01-07-08 
The Causal Model for Air Transport Safety (CATS) combines Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) 
[ 18], Fault Trees (FTs) [ 19] and Bayesian Belief Nets (BBNs) [ 8] into a single continuous‐
discrete nonparametric BBN ([ 6], [ 7]). The ESD methodology is used for representing 
accident scenarios. An ESD is a representation of an event tree which distinguishes different 
types of events. An ESD consists of an initiating event, pivotal event(s), and an end state. 
Where necessary, the initiating and pivotal events are detailed in a sub‐model which can be 
a Fault Tree or a Bayesian Belief Net.  A schematic representation of the CATS model is 
presented in Figure 1.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Schematic representation of the CATS model 
 
Figure 1. shows the BBN representing the CATS model. It is evident that the simple idea 
represented in Figure realizes a very complicated graphical structure once all the elements 
of the model are finally quantified and integrated into a single BBN. 
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ESDs and Summary nodes FTs and ESDs BBNs
 
 
Figure 1.6 The BBN representing the CATS model 
 
This document reports on the work realized by the DIAM in relation to the completion of 
the CATS model as presented in Figure 1.6 and tries to explain some of the steps taken for 
its completion. The project spans over a period of time of three years. Intermediate reports 
have been presented throughout the project’s progress. These are presented in Appendix 1.  
 
In this report the continuous‐discrete distribution‐free BBNs are briefly discussed. The 
human reliability models developed for dealing with dependence in the model variables are 
described and the software application UniNet is presented.  
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2 Graphical Models: Event Trees, Fault Trees and 
Bayesian Belief Nets 
 
 
This chapter compares and contrasts three common types of graphical models used in risk 
and reliability theory. Event Trees, Fault Trees and Bayesian Belief Nets (BBNs). All are used 
in the CATS model. The discussion is aimed at non‐technical readers, and is designed to 
show how these types of models work together. .Fault trees and event trees have been 
used together in risk analysis since its inception; therefore, the discussion is economized by 
focusing on BBNs and Fault trees. 
 
We follow customary parlance that “arc” denotes a directed arrow between two nodes, 
whereas “edge” is an undirected link. Event Trees and Fault trees both have implicit 
directionality associated with their links, and we therefore term them arcs, even though 
they are rowheads.   usually drawn without ar
2.1 Event trees 
 
 
Event trees consist of two basic elements: Nodes and arcs. Nodes are also called events 
even if there is not really anything that “happens”. The arcs connect the events. They are 
usually represented by arrows, indicating the logical or temporal progression through the 
tree. In most cases the logic of the tree runs from cause to consequence. The cause is also 
called the parent; the consequence is called the child. Nodes generally have only two states: 
Yes or True and No or False. We restrict attention to two‐valued events. If we exit the 
parent node via the ‘true’ arc, then all subsequent events on this path are conditional upon 
the Parent being True; similarly for False.  
 
Since the tree has a direction: it belongs to the class of Directed Graphs. Since a child cannot 
be the parent of its ancestors, a cycle is not possible. So an event tree belongs to the class of 
Directed Acyclic Graphs or DAGs. A distinctive feature of event trees among DAGs is that 
they have exactly one source node, that is, one nod without a parent. On the other hand 
they have many sink nodes – nodes without children. These correspond to all possible end 
states of the system being modelled. 
 
Although we tend to think that time progresses if we go from parent to child to grandchild 
etc., this is actually not what the tree represents. The tree is strictly LOGICAL. This means 
that the states set themselves instantaneously. 
 
Draft 01-07-08 
Therefore in event trees, events can be strung together that do not have a causal 
relationship. For instance to have water spilled form a glass (Figure 2.1), there has to be 
water in the glass and the glass has to fall over. The water in the glass is not the cause of it 
falling over, nor the other way around.  
Figure 2.1 Two versions of the event tree for the same accident: water spilled on 
table. 
Glass on 
table
No water on 
table (glass 
tipped)
Water in 
glass
Glass falls 
over
No water on 
table
Water on 
tabel
YesYesYes
NoNo
Glass on 
table
No water on 
table (glass 
tipped)
Glass falls 
over
Water in 
glass
No water on 
table
Water on 
tabel
YesYesYes
NoNo
 
 
 
The two states of each node are associated with probabilities which must sum to one. The 
probabilities are the chances that the state of the node is True or False. These are  
conditional probabilities, conditional on all predecessors. This means that the total 
probability of the true state of a node is the probability that the node is reached in the tree 
multipli oing into the true exit. ed by the probability of g
2.2 Fault trees 
 
 
 
Fault trees have three basic elements: nodes and arcs, as in event trees, and gates. For an 
overview on FTs see ([ 19]). In event trees the tree branches out at every node. Fault‐trees 
combine arcs in gates. The logical flow is from basic events to a “Top Event”. Cycles are 
forbidden, so fault trees are also DAGs. In contrast to event trees, there are many source 
nodes – these are the basic events of the fault tree. There is typically one sink node – a node 
EEMCS‐TU Delft  
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without children, namely the Top Event. Whereas Event Trees model the possible states of a 
system, Fault Trees model the possible ways in which a given event can occur.  
 
A node can have only two states: true or false. The state of a node with parents is 
completely determined by the state of the parents and the type of gate in which they 
combine. If they combine in an AND gate, the node is True if and only if all parents are true. 
If only one parent is False, the child is False. (Figure 2.2). 
 
If the parents combine in an OR gate, the node is True if and only if one or more of the 
parents is True. There are more types of gates, but they occur less frequently. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Examples of OR and AND gates. 
OR AND
TOP EVENT
TRUE
TOP EVENT 
FALSE
BASE1
FALSE
BASE1
TRUE
BASE2
FALSE
BASE1
TRUE
 
 
Fault trees have one final sink node, that is, a node without children. This event is called the 
top event of the tree. The state of the top event is completely determined when the states 
of the basic events are specified.   
 
The stat scussed 
later. 
es of the base events can also be associated with probabilities, as will be di
2.3 Interdependencies in fault and event trees  
 
 
In many real systems the logic is not as straightforward as described above; what goes on in 
one branch of the tree actually influences what goes on in another branch. For example a 
system might have two redundant pumps for coolant. For the cooling system to fail it is 
sufficient that both pumps fail. Under normal circumstances the probability of both pumps 
failing independently would be the product of their individual failure probabilities. However, 
EEMCS‐TU Delft  
12
Draft 01-07-08 
they both depend on the electrical system; a power failure would take out both pumps 
together. In this case the pumps are said to fail due to a common cause. Whenever possible, 
common cause dependencies should be modelled in the fault tree. This is easily said, but 
often less easily done. In scramming a nuclear reactor, an accident may result if three or 
more neighbouring control rods fail to insert properly. These rods may fail independently. 
However, of greater concern is the possibility that they fail due to some common cause. In 
this case the set of possible common causes is more difficult to identify and more difficult to 
model in the fault tree. Mathematical models must be posited. Detecting the effect of 
common causes from data is often very challenging . 
 
Whereas hardware common causes can in principle be identified and modelled with 
engineering knowledge of the system, with other common causes this is more problematic. 
A few examples illustrate this point: 
 
1. A fire near a cable tray can disable multiple components simultaneously,  
2. A flaw in the training of maintenance personnel can cause maintenance errors to 
occur simultaneously in physically separated sub‐systems,  
3. An error in the building design may force evacuation of the control room in certain 
otherwise non‐critical situations, thus increasing the chance of operator error.  
4. A poor safety culture at top management levels can degrade operator alertness, 
maintenance performance, training, acquisition and testing of spare parts, quality of 
emergency procedures, etc, etc.  
5. A flaw in the regulatory regime may allow unsafe situations and practices to arise 
simultaneously in an entire population of systems. 
 
All of these features can increase the probability of multiple simultaneous failures in a 
system. Hence if we simply gathered failure data from system components, and assume 
that these systems can only fail independently, we may produce an unrealistically optimistic 
prediction of system performance. With an appropriate model, we can predict the effects of 
different levels of training, inspection, maintenance etc. 
 
Dependence modelling in fault trees works well when dependences can be associated with 
failures of support system hardware components. Such support systems might include the 
electrical system, the sprinkler system, the lubrication system, and the software control 
system. In such cases, the failure of a support system causes the failures, or unavailabilities, 
of multiple components.  
 
Other dependences, such as numbers (2) – (5) above, do not express themselves directly by 
causing simultaneous component failures. Rather, they simultaneously influence the 
probability of failure of multiple components. Examples include poor maintenance, poor 
operator training, poor incident reporting, poor safety culture, etc. Fault tree modelling 
cannot readily capture dependences that influence the probabilities of failure. Influences 
acting on the probability of failure, rather than on failure itself, must be captured in the 
uncertainty analysis of fault trees. Bayesian Belief Nets are a modelling tool specifically 
designed to capture probabilistic influence. Before we can fully understand uncertainty 
EEMCS‐TU Delft  
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analysis of fault trees, we must understand the difference between Boolean and ordinary 
arithmetic. 
2.4 Boolean Arithmetic for Fault Trees 
 
 
 
A Fault Tree is just a picture of a Boolean formula. In Boolean arithmetic, variables take only 
the values 0 or 1. Boolean arithmetic operates in Mod 2. Suppose X and Y are Boolean 
variables, in Boolean arithmetic, X +b Y, and X×bY are also Boolean variables, and hence take 
values 0 or 1. This means that X + Y must take only values 0 or 1, which is arranged by 
defining  X +b Y =  X + Y – XY;  X ×bY = XY. In Boolean arithmetic, addition and multiplication 
correspond to the operators AND and OR in propositional logic. Thus, X +b Y = “either X or Y 
or both”,  X ×b Y = “X and Y”.  In particular, in Boolean arithmetic, X2 = X; this corresponds to 
saying that the event X AND X is the same as the event X.  
 
A fault tree is a Boolean formula, when we fill in 0’s and 1’s for the basic events, and apply 
the AND and OR operators, we always obtain a 0 or 1 for the top event. In most cases, we 
don’t know whether a given basic event occurs, we know only its probability of occurrence. 
The probability of event X occurring is the expectation of the random variable X; since 
 
E(X) = Prob{X=1}× 1 + Prob{X=0} × 0 = Prob{X=1}. 
 
If the events X and Y are independent, then it is easy to check that 
 
E(X×bY) = E(X)E(Y); 
 
E(X +b Y) = E(X) + E(Y) – E(XY) = 
Prob{X=1} + Prob{Y=1} –  Prob{X AND Y = 1} = Prob{X  OR  Y}. 
 
This might suggest that we can just replace the Boolean variables at the base of a fault tree 
with their probabilities (i.e. their expectations) and compute the probability of the top event 
with ordinary arithmetic. This is NOT true, in general, and it may depend on how the fault 
tree is displayed. A simple example illustrates this feature. Suppose the Top Event occurs 
when either X AND Y  or X AND Z  occurs.  We could represent this with two simple, logically 
equivalent, fault trees: 
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AND 
X OR 
Y Z 
OR 
AND AND 
X X Z Y 
 
 
Figure 2.3Two logically equivalent FTs. 
 
 
The Boolean formula from the left tree is 
 
X×bY   +b   X×bZ   =   XY + XZ – XYXZ 
 
The Boolean formula from the right tree is  
 
X ×b (Y +b Z) = X(Y + Y – YZ) = XY + XY – XYZ. 
 
If we apply Boolean reduction to the first formula: XYXZ = XYZ, we see that these two 
formulas are equivalent. However, if we replace the variables by their expectations  and 
apply ordinary arithmetic, we will get different answers. From the first tree we would get 
the incorrect formula: 
 
Prob(Top Event) = 
Prob{X=1}Prob{Y=1} + Prob{X=1}Prob{Z=1} –                                      (1) 
Prob{X=1}Prob{Y=1}Prob{X=1} Prob{Z=1} 
 
The correct calculation would be obtained from the right tree: 
 
Prob(Top Event) = 
Prob{X=1}Prob{Y=1}+Prob{X=1}Prob{Z=1}‐ Prob{X=1}Prob{Y=1}Prob{Z=1}                   (2) 
 
The problem is that when we compute (X AND Y) AND (X AND Z) with expectations in the 
left tree, we would include the term “P{X=1}” term twice. 
 
In general, computing probabilities of occurrence from a fault tree requires some careful 
manipulations, before substituting Boolean variables with their expected values. However, if 
our fault trees contain no “repeated events” then we can replace Boolean variables with 
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expectations and replace Boolean arithmetic with ordinary arithmetic. This assumes that we 
have captured all common cause dependencies in the fault tree. This means that once 
probabilities are assigned to the basic events, the probability of joint occurrence is 
computed as the product of the probabilities.  
 
When repeated events are present, we can estimate the probability of the top event by 
various methods. One method is to reduce the fault tree to a minimal cut set representation: 
we write the top event as a disjunction of conjunctions of several basic events, where each 
combination is a minimal set of events whose joint occurrence is sufficient to fail the system.  
A prose reading of the minimal cut set equation would be something like: 
 
Top event happens if and only if EITHER: 
 
BE1 And BE5 And BE23 
Or 
BE23 And BE8 And BE31 And BE 26 
Or 
Etc. 
 
We can estimate the probability of occurrence using the inclusion‐exclusion principle. 
However, if the combinations which fail the system have low probability, then we may 
approximate the probability of the disjunction as the sum of the probabilities of the 
combinations. We do not explain this further here, as this material is available in any 
standard text, and the fault trees in the CATS model do not involve repeated events. In the 
CATS model, we can simply replace basic events with expectations and compute with 
ordinary arithmetic. 
2.5 Bayesian Belief Net 
 
 
 
A Bayesian Belief Net is a special kind of directed acyclic graph. In a BBN nodes represent 
random variables and arcs represent probabilistic or functional influence. Since Boolean 
gates in a fault tree are simply functional dependences of a particular sort, and Event trees 
are probabilistic dependences of a particular sort, it is evident that BBNs are a more general 
structure than either event of fault trees. Thus it is possible to represent both as BBNs. In 
the CATS model there are event trees and fault trees, which are represented as parts of an 
over‐arching BBN. The point of using a BBN, however, is not simply to replicate modelling of 
event trees and fault trees; rather, the point resides in the fact that BBNs can capture 
probabilistic influences between random variables – not just two valued events ‐ which 
cannot be modelled functionally. This enables us, in principle, to capture factors which 
influence the probability of failure for basic events in a fault tree: the factors (2) – (5) in 
section 1.1.3. 
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A simple example helps. Suppose we are interested in a particular human error event. In a 
fault tree this is a Boolean variable, but since our fault tree has no repeated events, we may 
replace this Boolean variable by its expectation. We wish to model those factors which 
influence this human error probability. Suppose we identify Training and Fatigue as relevant 
influences. We construct the simple BBN shown below 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Simple graph representing a BBN for human error probability. 
 
 
Human error probability is operationalized as the relative frequency of error per demand. 
Training is operationalized as ‘hours spent in refresher courses over last 3 years’ and Fatigue 
is operationalized on the Stanford sleepiness scale. From data we can recover the 
distribution of operators training and the distribution over possible fatigue states. We also 
have human error data which, with some appropriate (Bayesian) procedure will enable us to 
form a distribution over the probability of human error. Thus we have the marginal 
distributions for all the above variables. However, marginal data does not tell us how 
Training and Fatigue influence Human Error Probability. 
 
Functional influence 
 
As good engineers, we might try to capture the relation between these vaiables with some 
mathematical model. We could always start with a Taylor expansion around certain nominal 
values (note the inclusion of the first interaction term): 
 
HEP = HEP0 +  (TR – TR0)∂HEP/∂TR0 + (FA – FA0)∂HEP/∂FA0 +                    (3) 
(TR – TR0) (FA – FA0)∂
2HEP/(∂TA0 ∂FA0), 
 
This of course is a possible approach, but it requires an appropriate choice of nominal values, 
a truncation of higher order terms at an appropriate point, and an estimation of partial 
derivatives. If none of these choices can be supported by data, it might make more sense to 
capture the influence as probabilistic influence. 
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Probabilistic influence 
 
In opting for probabilistic influence, we are acknowledging data do not support a functional 
ependence relation. Instead, we opt for coarse modelling of how high / low values tend to 
ous observations of all three variables. 
hat is, we have observations of equivalent systems s = 1,…K in which we observe (HEPs, TRs, 
th above their median values?  
igh values of HEP 
nd TR tend to occur together, if it is lower than one quarter, then high values of HEP tend 
d
occur together.  This is measured by rank correlation. 
 
Suppose we have some multivariate data of simultane
T
FAs) for each s = 1…K.  We could then capture the influence as probabilistic influence in 
various ways, we might ask, for example: 
 
In how many systems s are HEPs AND TR bo
 
If that number is larger than one quarter of all observed systems, then h
a
to occur with low values of TR, and conversely.  The tendency of high values to occur 
together is measured by rank correlation, and from the answer to this question, we could 
estimate the rank correlation between HEP and TR. The reader is spared the mathematical 
details for the time being. cite 
 
To capture the influence of Fatigue in addition to TR, we might ask: 
ove their medians, was 
lso FAs above its median? 
ould estimate the conditional rank correlation of FA and HEP 
iven  TR.  
raph has no influence between FA and TR; this is a modelling assumption which 
ight be checked against data. For example, we might ask whether systems characterized 
 
In how many of those systems  in which both HEPs and TRs were ab
a
 
With this information we c
g
 
The above g
m
by high values of TR tend to show lower values of FA.  For this example, we stick with the 
above graph.  The reader may accept on faith that the information acquired, together with 
the independence implied by the graph, together with an assumption on the type of 
distributions realizing the rank correlations, completely determine the joint distribution of 
HEP, TR and FA (cite). The rank and conditional rank correlations obtained may be shown in 
the BBN as in Figure 2.5 below. 
 
The correlation between TR and HEP is negative: high values of training tend to go with low 
alues of HEP. 
ot have the sort of multivariate data needed to answer the above questions? 
 that case we ask the very same questions which we would ask to the data, if we had it, to 
v
 
What if we do n
In
knowledgeable experts. Many people balk at the introduction of expert judgment into 
quantitative risk studies. Of course, real data is always preferable. On the other hand, it 
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would be very unscientific to assume that influences for which we have no data, therefore 
do not exist. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Simple graph representing a BBN for human error probability with rank 
 
 
 this Ns will be discussed, next chapter deals in more detail 
uppose we want to set a training level equal to 50 hrs per year; or 150 hours in three years. 
he distribution of HEP is shifted to the left; the mean has dropped from 0.00902 to 0.00396.   
f course, a real data set might not contain enough systems with TR = 150 to assess this 
                                                
and conditional rank correlations attached to its edges. 
 
2.6 Using a BBN 
section some features of BB
 
In
with some of the concepts presented here. This section already uses UniNet (see next 
chapter) to some extent. The first thing we can do with a BBN is to compute joint and 
marginal distributions. Switching to the histogram view1, we first show the unconditional 
(marginal) distributions. The mean and standard deviations for each variable are shown 
beneath the histogram in Figure 2.6. 
 
S
How might that affect the human error probability distribution? If our training program 
does not change the system in any other way, our answer to this question is obtained by 
conditionalizing on TR = 150.  This means, that changing a given system to have 150 hours of 
training would produce the same effect that we would see in a large subset of the original 
systems for which TR = 150 (Figure 2.7) 
 
T
 
O
effect. For this reason we build a density function for the three variables, based on the 
information displayed in the BBN. Again, the details are suppressed in this discussion. A 
 
1 In UniNet 
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density may be conceived as a mathematical smoothing of the histograms displayed in the 
BBN’s, but then applied to all three variables at once. 
 
We might further ask whether training enables operators to perform better when fatigued. 
Conditionalizing on TR = 150 and FA = 6, we see that at fatigue level 6, the well trained 
operators still have a lower average human error probability than the overall average 
(Figure 2.8). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Simple graph representing a BBN for human error probability with rank 
and conditional rank correlations attached to its edges and nodes as marginal 
distributions. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Conditional Distribution (TR = 150) of human error probability for the 
graph in figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.8 Conditional Distribution (TR = 150) and (FA = 6) of human error 
probability for the graph in figure 2.6. 
 
2.7 Fault Trees in BBN  
 
 
 
Our purpose of modelling HEP is to capture probabilistic influence on basic events of a fault 
tree. Let us assume that our Top Event, System Failure, can occur in only two ways, either 
failure scenario 1 occurs, or failure scenario 2 occurs (or both). In both these scenarios, 
failure occurs if a subsystem fails AND human operator fails to recover. The subsystems are 
different, and the operators of the two systems may be different. The occurrence of human 
error in subsystem 1 is not related to human error in subsystem 2. However, the probability 
of error in both cases is influenced by training and fatigue. We assume that training and 
fatigue are the same for both subsystems. The combined system fault tree with HEP BBN 
may be represented in one BBN, as shown below in figure 2.9. 
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Figure 2.9 Conditional Distribution (TR = 150) and (FA = 6) of human error 
probability for the graph in figure 2.6. 
 
 
 
Failure_scenario1, failure_scenario2 and system_failure are represented as functional nodes.  
Failure_scenario1 is a probability, which is the probability of subsys1 AND HEP1, similarly for 
failure_scenario2.  All these probabilities are random variables. The system failure is a 
function of the two failure scenarios, as shown in figure 2.10 
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Figure 2.10 UniNet view of functional node representing system failure 
 
 
If we shift to the histogram view in UniNet, we see the distributions of all variables (figure 
2.11). 
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Figure 2.11 UniNet histogram view of the example BBN in figure 2.9 
 
 
A detailed picture of system_failure is shown below in figure 2.12 (also from UniNet). The 
median probability is 5.8148 E‐4, with 95%‐tile 8.7752E‐4. 
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Figure 2.12 UniNet histogram view of the node system_failure from the example 
BBN in figure 2.9 
 
 
The BBN for HEP has the effect of correlating the variables HEP1 and HEP2. In fact their 
correlation is 0.58. If we had not introduced the BBN for HEP, or equivalently, if we had 
made the influence of TR and FA on HEP equal to 0, then the distribution of the top event 
would change slightly. The result of this change is shown below in figure 2.13  
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Figure 2.13 UniNet histogram view of the node system_failure from the example 
BBN in figure 2.9 making all correlations equal to zero 
 
 
Without dependence on TR and FA, the 95%‐tile of system failure shifts from 8.7752E‐4 to 
8.3506E‐4.  
 
The effect of conditionalizing TR at 150 hours in the BBN with the original dependence 
structure (figure 2.11) can now be propagated through the fault tree up to the system 
failure. The mean probability for system failure shifts from 5.88E‐4 to 2.75E‐4 (figure 2.14). 
 
 
 
EEMCS‐TU Delft  
26
Draft 01-07-08 
 
 
Figure 2.14 UniNet histogram view of the BBN in figure 2.11 conditionalized on 
(TR=150) 
 
 
2.8 Calibration and apportionment 
 
 
In the model discussed above we had data on the HEP’s, on Training, Fatigue and on subsys1 
and subsys2. With this information we predict the distribution of System_failure. In some 
cases, such as CATS, we have some data on System_failure, typically this will be in the form 
of expected values or generic probabilities for System_failure In such cases the modelling 
serves to apportion this generic probability over the underlying basic events and BBN nodes. 
The goal is to be able to predict how changes at a lower level will impact the probabilities at 
the higher levels.  
 
In performing this apportionment, we may have some expected values at intermediate 
levels to guide us. The apportionment activity consists of: 
 
1. Developing expected values from data 
2. Assessing the degree of variability consistent with the expected values, at those 
nodes for which distributional information is lacking. 
3. Checking that with these variabilities, the expectations of the higher events are 
still calibrated on the data from step (1). 
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We saw in the example above that the dependence in basic events introduced by the BBN 
caused a slight shift in the distribution of System_failure. If the distributions are highly 
skewed, or if the dependences are very strong, the induced shift might be enough to disturb 
the calibration. In this case the above steps must be iterated.  
 
The simple example is extended to illustrate these points. We consider a system consisting 
of 10 failure scenarios, each one similar to the two failure scenarios discussed above. The 
BBN for this system is:  
 
 
 
 
We compare the distribution of System _failure with and without dependence. Relative to 
the independent case, adding dependence causes the mean to shift up imperceptibly, but 
the standard deviation increases from  4.506 × 10‐4 to 1.033×10‐3.  
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With 
dependence 
Without 
dependence 
 
 
This effect could be altered if the distributions are more skewed to the right.  To 
investigate, we change the distribution of all the subsys variables, keeping the mean 
fixed, but increasing the standard deviation by roughly a factor 10. The 95%‐tile is 
increased by a factor 4: 
 
 
 
Narrow 
Wide
 
The resulting effect on System_failure is shown below. Now the standard deviation and 
the mean remain effectively unchanged. 
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Wide, with 
dependence Wide, without 
dependence 
 
 
In these examples the effect of adding dependence is visible in the standard deviation of the 
top event, but not in the mean. Thus, in these examples the dependence induced by the 
BBN would not require iterating the calibration step.  However, we cannot guarantee that 
this will remain true for very large systems like CATS, with very highly skewed distributions. 
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3 BBNs and UNINET 
 
 
This chapter goes into more detail about the non‐parametric continuous Bayesian Belief 
Nets, and explains essential features of the UNINET software system which implements this 
type of Belief Net. UNINET was developed for the CATS project, and its specific design 
features profited from previous projects in which commercial off the shelf BBN software 
platforms were tested. 
 
To recall, a BBN is a graphical structure known as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). A DAG is a 
set of nodes and arcs, or directed edges, between nodes, such that there is no directed 
cycle. In a BBN, nodes represent univariate random variables, and arcs represent influences. 
Node1 is a parent  of Node2 if there is a directed arc going from Node1 toward Node2. 
Node1 is an ancestor of Node2 if there is a directed path from Node1 to Node2. A node with 
a non‐empty set of parents is a child node. A node without parents is a source node, a node 
without children is a sink node.    
 
The simple example in chapter 1 for Human Error Probability is used throughout this 
chapter to illustrate features.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 BBN example for chapter 3 
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Three types of BBNs may be distinguished: discrete, normal (or discrete‐normal) and non 
parametric continuous‐discrete. The first two are available in other commercial packages. 
All BBNs can have functional nodes (nodes which are functions of their parents); differences 
relate to the treatment of probabilistic nodes. The ensuing discussion refers to probabilistic 
nodes.  
 
(i) Discrete 
 
The random variables have discrete distributions. Source nodes are assigned (marginal) 
distributions, each child node is assigned a conditional probability table, giving the 
distribution over child's possible values, conditional on each possible combination of values 
of the parents. The number of probabilities that must be assessed and maintained for a 
child node is exponential in the number of parents. Adding a new parent node requires 
reassessing all children influences. If marginal distributions are known for child nodes, there 
is no way of entering this information directly; instead conditional probability tables must 
be tweaked to comply with all marginal data. Discrete BBNs have a heavy 
assessment/maintenance burden and are suitable for small problems only. 
 
  (ii) Discrete normal 
 
In this case the set of variables is assumed to follow a joint normal distribution (certain 
source nodes may be discrete). Each child is associated with a mean value and conditional 
variance. Each influence is associated with a partial  regression  coefficient. Loosely the 
partial regression coefficient e.g. for 5  with respect to 1 says how much the conditional 
mean of 5 changes as a result of a unit change in the value of parent 1. Discrete normal 
BBNs work well if indeed the normality assumptions hold. If not, then: 
 
• The individual variables must be transformed to normal (requiring of course the 
marginal distributions). If F is the cumulative distribution function of random 
variable X (continuous, invertible), and Φ is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function, then Φ‐1(F(X)) transforms X to normal (sometimes called the 
normal version of X),   
• The conditional variance in normal units must be constant; this is the variance with 
respect to the units for which the distribution is normal.  The partial regression 
coefficients apply to the normal units of the transformed variables, not to the 
original units. This places a heavy burden on any expert elicitation, and is dubious in 
most real applications, unless indeed the transformation to normal is almost linear.   
 
If a parent node is added or deleted after quantification, then the previously assessed 
partial regression coefficients must be re‐assessed.  
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  (iii) Non‐parametric continuous/discrete 
 
UNINET supports non‐parametric continuous/discrete BBNs with important distinguishing 
features.  The main distinguishing features of UNINET are: 
 
• UNINET supports non‐parametric continuous/discrete BBNs, supplemented with 
functional nodes. 
 
• Probabilistic nodes may be assigned arbitrary continuous or discrete distributions.  
 
• Probabilistic influence is represented by conditional rank correlation, that is, by rank 
correlation in a conditional distribution, according to a protocol based on an 
indexing of the parents.  Influence of the first parent on the child is unconditional 
rank correlation, influence of the second parent on the child is the conditional rank 
correlation given the first parent, etc. The conditional rank correlations are 
algebraically independent, that is, previously chosen values do not constrain future 
choices. Unspecified correlations may be accommodated without confronting the 
matrix completion problem ([ 20], [ 21]) 
 
• The rank correlation is realized using the joint normal copula. The indexing is user‐
editable, and parent nodes can be added without re‐quantifying the previous 
influences.  
 
• Analytic, real time conditioning is supported for thousands of probabilistic nodes.  
Analytic conditioning is conditioning on a single value, and applies only for 
probabilistic nodes. 
 
• Sample based conditioning is supported. Sample based conditioning conditionalizes 
on intervals and applies both the probabilistic and functional nodes. 
 
• UNINET can model an empirical multivariate distribution by building a joint density 
function, which can be analytically conditioned. 
 
Graphics and sensitivity analysis are supported in satellite software packages UNIGRAPH 
and UNISENS. 
 
3.2 BBNs for Uncertainty Analysis /  Stochastic 
Modeling 
 
 
In uncertainty analysis/stochastic modeling, the analyst: 
 
• defines a set of random variables,  
• defines a joint distribution for these random variables 
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• defines other variables which are functions of the random variables 
• Monte Carlo samples the entire joint distributions (probabilistic and functional 
variables 
• Interprets and communicates the results. 
 
 
When using UNINET to perform uncertainty analysis or stochastic modeling, the random 
variables are assigned marginal distributions, either chosen from a list of parametric 
distributions, or from a user defined distribution file. The user also specifies a DAG to 
capture conditional relations. Probabilistic influence between parent and child is 
represented as conditional rank correlation. Functional influence is defined with the help of 
an extended functional parser. A joint probability density for the probabilistic nodes is built 
using the joint normal copula to realize the dependence relations.  This density can be 
updated h Monte Carlo tools.   analytically, or sampled and analyzed wit
3.3 Analytic conditioning 
 
 
 
The distinctive feature of UNINET is its analytical conditioning capability. BBNs with 
thousands of probabilistic nodes can be conditionalized on arbitrary values of random 
variables, whereby the conditional distribution is computed in a few minutes. This is only 
possible with the joint normal copula. Random variables are treated as transformations of 
joint normal variables. If Z = (Z1,…Zn) denotes a joint normal distribution of normal variables 
Zi with mean zero and unit variance, then random variables Xi,…Xn are written as  
 
(X1,…Xn)  = ( F1
‐1Φ(Z1),… Fn
‐1Φ(Zn) ) 
 
where Fi is the cumulative distribution function of random variable Xi, and Φ is the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal variable. If Fi is continuous 
invertible, this transformation is rank preserving, the rank correlations of Xi, Xj  will be the 
same as that of Zi,Zj. Complications arise for discrete variables (see Hanea, [ 22]) The rank 
correlation of normal variables is computed from the product moment correlation with the 
Pearson transformation. For details see ([ 20]) 
 
Conditioning on the value Xi  =  x entails conditioning Z on Zi  = Φ‐1  (Fi(x)).  Letting Z(Xi=x) 
denote this conditional distribution,  the conditional distribution of X1,…Xn , when X1,…Xn  are 
joined by the joint normal copula, is given by 
 
( X1,…Xn | Xi=x ) = F1
‐1Φ(Z1 (Xi=x) ),… Fn
‐1Φ(Zn (Xi=x)). 
 
Note that Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, but Zj(Xi=x) is not in 
general a standard normal variable, as its mean and variance are altered by the conditioning. 
For this reason, the marginal  distribution of Xj given Xi = x is no longer equal to the 
unconditional marginal  F1
‐1Φ(Zj), but has become F1
‐1Φ(Zj (Xi=x) ) . 
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The following two graphs illustrate by showing that the conditional standard deviation of 
HEP1 changes from 0.00181 to 0.00134 as we conditionalize on TR = 40 or TR = 190. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Ordinal Data Mining / Multivariate Density 
Modeling 
 
 
In the previous chapter we discussed how a BBN might be quantified from data. In risk and 
reliability applications, the relevant multivariate data is often lacking. None the less, it is 
important to understand how a BBN would be built and quantified if data were available. 
This serves to underscore the point that a BBN model can be fully data driven if the data is 
available, and that structured expert judgment is used to fill in the data gaps. In most cases 
in CATS, the marginal distributions for the probabilistic nodes come from data, only the 
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dependence structure comes from experts. The features discussed here are unique to non‐
parametric continuous discrete BBNs, and to their implementation in UNINET, so the 
discussion focuses more on UNINET. 
 
UNINET can be used to build a joint density for ordinal multivariate data. “Ordinal” means 
that the ordering of the values of the variables is meaningful. Ages, weights, IQ scores, 
income, body mass index, etc, are ordinal data. Street addresses, social security numbers, 
license plate numbers are not ordinal data. UNINET builds a joint distribution based on the 
empirical rank correlations and uses the joint normal copula. It assumes that the important 
dependences can be captured in dependences between the rankings of the variables. 
 
The method will be illustraed on a very simple example, infact the Hunam Error Probability 
model of chapter 1 is used to generate multivariate data. 
 
The multivariate data set must be in the form of an XL compliant comma separated file.  An 
example of such a file, in XL, is shown below. The variable names are on the first row, each 
succeeding rows contains one sample from the multivariate distribution.  
 
 
 
UNINET models an empirical multivariate distribution with a normal copula. The marginal 
distributions are taken directly from the data.  The adequacy of such a model is evaluated 
statistically, by comparing an appropriate multivariate dependence measure for the 
empirical and the modeled distributions. The appropriate measure in this case is the 
determinant of the rank correlation matrix, which is closely related to the mutual 
information (Hanea et al 2008).  We compare the determinant of the empirical rank 
correlation matrix (DER) with the determinant of the rank correlation matrix under the 
assumption that the rank dependencies are represented by the joint normal copula (DNR). If 
the hypothesis that the dependences come from a joint normal copula is not rejected at an 
appropriate significance level, then the UNINET model is appropriate.  A BBN can be built by 
including the most important dependence relations. The adequacy of the BBN, relative to 
the ‘saturated’ graph, is again evaluated by comparing determinant of the rank correlation 
matrix based on the BBN (DBBNR) with the DNR. When a suitable BBN model is found, it can 
be analytically conditionalized from the empirical distribution, or alternatively the BBN 
density can be used to generate as many samples as desired, for further Monte Carlo post 
processing. 
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3.4.1 Rank correlation 
 
The rank correlation of two continuous random variables X,Y is the product moment 
correlation of their respective quantile functions: 
 
ρr(X,Y) = ρ(FX(X), FY(Y)) 
 
Where F f X, Y respectively.  X, FY are the cumulative distribution functions o
3.4.2 Empirical rank correlation 
 
 
To determine the empirical rank correlation of a  set (x1,  y1)…  (xn,  yn)   of n bivariate 
observations of X and Y, we first construct the empirical distribution functions: 
 
FX(r) = #{xi ≤ r}/ (n+1);  FY(r) = #{yi ≤ r}/ (n+1). 
 
The empirical rank correlation of X and Y is then the product moment correlation of FX(X) 
and FY(Y): 
 
ρr(X,Y) = ρ(FX(X), FY(Y)) 
 
To view the empirical rank correlation matrix and the DER, select the DATA  menu option 
and choose COMPARE CORRELATION MATRICES:  
 
Note tat HEP1 and HEP2 have empiical rank correlation 0.575; this is caused by their 
common anscesors in the BBN. Training and Fatigue are independent, the correlation 
0.00306 is noise. 
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3.4.3 Joint normal copula 
 
If Z = (Z1,…Zn) denotes a joint normal distribution of normal variables Zi with mean zero and 
unit variance, then random variables Xi,…Xn are connected by the joint normal copula if   
 
(X1,…Xn)  =(  F1
‐1Φ(Z1),… Fn
‐1Φ(Zn) ) 
 
where Fi  is the cumulative distribution function of random variable  Xi, and Φ is the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal variable.  If  Fi, Fj are continuous 
invertible, the transformation Zi → Xi   is rank preserving, and the rank correlations of  Xi, Xj  
will be the same as that of Zi,Zj.  If  Xi is discrete then rank correlation is not perfectly 
preserved, and the degree of discretization influences the lack of preservation (see Hanea 
2008). The rank correlation of normal variables is computed from the product moment 
correlation with the Pearson transformation: 
 
6 arcsin(ρ(Zi, Zj) /2) / π  =   ρ(Φ(Zi), Φ(Zj)) = ρr(Zi, Zj) 
 
Where ρr rank correlation and ρ denotes the product moment correlation:  
 
ρ(Zi, Zj) = ( E(ZiZj) –E(Zi) E(Zj) ) / (VAR(Zi) VAR(Zj) )1/2
 
Whereas every rank correlation between two variables can be realized as the rank 
correlation of a bivariate normal distribution, in higher dimensions this is NOT true.  For 
details see (Kurowicka and Cooke, 2006‐A).  
3.4.4 Empirical normal rank correlation 
 
 
If Xi denotes a random variable with empirical distribution function Fi,  then  
 
 Zi(Xi)  = Φ‐1 ( Fi(Xi) ) 
 
is the empirical  normal  version of  Xi . Applying the Pearson transformation, we find the 
empirical normal rank correlation of Xi, Xj as 
 
6 arcsin(ρ(Zi(Xi), Zj(Xj)) /2) / π. 
 
The empirical normal rank correlation of Xi,  Xj  is not in equal to the empirical rank 
correlation of Xi, Xj unless Xi and Xj are joined by the normal copula.  
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3.4.5 BBN rank correlation 
 
When a graphical structure is specified the rank correlation of all variables is computed 
assuming the conditional independence implied by the graph, and assuming that any  two 
variable opula. s have the rank correlation induced by the joint normal c
3.4.6 Empirical rank determinant DER 
   
 
Where Fi is the empirical cumulative distribution function of variable Xi  ,  i  =  1…N; the 
empirical rank determinant is  
 
DER = | [ ρ(Fi(Xi), Fj(Xj) ]i,j = 1…N | 
 
where | | denotes the determinant. The determinant of a correlation matrix measures the 
“amount of linear dependence” between the variables. Its value is 1 if the variables are 
indepen bination of the 
others. 
dent, and zero if one of the variables can be written as a linear com
3.4.7 Empirical normal rank determinant DNR 
 
The empirical normal rank determinant is the determinant of the rank correlation matrix of 
the empirical normal version of Xi, i = 1,…N: 
 
DNR  = |  {6 arcsin(ρ(Zi(Xi), Zj(Xj)) /2) / π}i,j = 1…N
 
Where | | denotes the determinant. DNR is the determinant of the saturated BBN, that is, 
the BBN les.  in which there is an arc between every pair of variab
3.4.8 BBN rank determinant DBBNR 
 
 
The BBN rank determinant is the determinant of the BBN rank correlation matrix. Unlike 
DNR, DBBNR reflects the conditional independence relations imposed by the BBN. If the 
BBN is not saturated, then DBBNR > DNR. DBBNR is approximated as: 
 
DBBNR elations ρr in BBN= Πall conditional rank corr
3.4.9 Pitfalls 
 (1‐ρr2). 
 
 
The user should be aware of a number of pitfalls in using the DNR or DBBNR as a test 
statistic for assessing the adequacy of a BBN model.  
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i)  Shrinking determinant 
If the number of variables exceeds the number of samples in an empirical multivariate data 
set, then the DER will be zero. If some of the variables have repeated values, then this can 
occur even if the number of samples exceeds the number of variables. If the number of 
variables is large though not in excess of the number of samples, then DER can become very  
small. 
ii)  Discrete variables 
When rank correlations are specified for discrete variables in stochastic modeling, the rank 
correlation realized is the rank correlation between two uniform variables. A discrete 
variable is realized by F‐1(U), where F is the cumulative distribution function of the discrete 
variable. F‐1 is thus a many‐one transformation. This will cause empirical rank correlations 
involving this discrete variable to differ from the stipulated rank correlations (see Hanea 
2008). In judging statistical adequacy, the user must take this into account by assuming that 
the discrete variable is a many‐one transform of a normal variable. Otherwise, the lack of 
continuity will be treated as lack of fit of the joint normal copula. 
iii)  Directionality 
It is impossible to infer directionality of influence from multivariate data. Insight into the 
causal processes generating the data should be used, whenever possible, in constructing a 
BBN model. Because of this fact, there are different BBNs that are wholly equivalent, and 
many non‐equivalent BBNs may provide statistically acceptable models of a given 
multivariate ordinal data set. 
 
3.5  Assessing model adequacy 
 
 
 
The question of model adequacy is answered by defining a statistical measure for 
multivariate dependence and testing whether the hypothesis that the multivariate 
dependence could come from the joint normal copula should be rejected.  
 
The UNINET approach to this question is based on the mutual information as a measure of 
multivariate dependence (Joe, 1989).  The mutual information of a joint density f(x1, xn) with 
marginal densities f1,...fn is : 
 
∫ ln(f(x1,...xn)/f1(x1)...fn(xn))  f1(x1)...fn(xn) dx1,...dxn. 
 
For a joint normal distribution the mutual information is given by exp(‐2 ln |C|) where |C| is 
the determinant of the correlation matrix. Mutual information is invariant under monotone 
univariate transformations; therefore, this is also the mutual information of any distribution 
based on the joint normal copula. The determinant |C| is closely related to the determinant 
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|R| of the normal rank correlation matrix (DNR). To evaluate the suitability of a joint normal 
copula it is  convenient to compare DNR with the determinant of the empirical rank 
correlation matrix  DER.  We could also compare |C| with the “empirical mutual 
information” of the multivariate data set, were it not that the computation of the “empirical 
mutual information” imposes obstacles which are as yet unsurmounted. 
 
If the joint normal copula is a statistically acceptable model of the data, then the user can 
simplify the model by removing arcs whose conditional rank correlation is very close to zero, 
as these will not contribute significantly to the DNR.  By considering the determinant of the 
rank correlation matrix based on the BBN (DBBNR) one can determine whether the BBN is a 
statistically acceptable model of the empirical normal rank correlation matrix. 
 
The statistical tests are not currently supported in UNINET.  
 
The ideas are illustrated with the BBN model created to explain the multivariate data. 
Suppose  we believed that Training could influence HEP1 directly, but could influence HEP2 
only by influencing the variable Fatigue. We would  propose the following BBN. 
 
 
To check whether this represents a good model for our data, we compare the DBBN with 
DER: 
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The DBBN = 0.404967, while DER = 0.195521, In this case the difference is statistically too 
large. (Of course we know that the data was generated with the model from Chapter 1; this 
model used the normal copula, which explains why DER and DNR are equal.) We remove the 
arc from Fatigue to HEP2 and draw an arc from Training to HEP2: 
 
 
The fit has improved, since more of the dependence in the data is captured in the BBN. The 
arc from Training to Fat captures very little dependence; its removal would hardly affect the 
DBBN: 
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In general, it will be impossible to recover exactly a model which generated the data, from 
the data alone. We have statistical test to determine whether a model is not rejected by the 
data, but there may be many non‐rejected models. This situation is common in statistical 
inference. 
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4 Human reliability models. 
 
 
Three Homan reliability models have been built and quantified in collaboration with NLR the 
models and results from the expert elicitation are presented briefly next. More information 
about th 1 and references) e different models may be found in other sources (see appendix 
4.1 The flight crew performance model. 
 
 
The Flight Crew Performance model (FCP) was the first of the generic models that have 
been developed by the CATS consortium to represent dependence between base events in 
the FTs of the CATS model. This section is devoted to the description of the model, results 
from the expert elicitation and discussion. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 BBN representing the Flight Crew performance Model 
 
 
The BBN representing the FCP model is shown in Figure 4.1. The model has been described 
in detail in [ 17] and hence only a brief description is included here. 
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Node #  Definition 
Marginal 
distribution 
source 
1 
Total number of hours flown since the pilot’s license obtaining by 
first officers. 
Data 
2 
Number of days passed since last recurrence training for First 
Officers. 
Data 
3 
Stanford Sleepiness Scale. 1 signifies “feeling active and vital; wide 
awake” and 7 stands for “almost in reverie; sleep onset soon; 
struggle to remain awake”. 
Data 
4 Number of days passed since last recurrence training for Captains. Data 
5 
Total number of hours flown since the pilot’s license obtaining by 
captains. 
Data 
6 Number of Captains failing their proficiency check test per 10,000 SEJ2
7 
Number of First Officers failing their proficiency check test per 
10,000 
SEJ 
8 
Rainfall rate (mm/hr) translated into airborne weather radar in a 
cockpit. 
Data 
9 
Number of flights in which the pilot and first officer will have a 
different mother tongue per 100,000 
SEJ 
10 
Number of Captains or/and First Officers failing their proficiency 
check test per 10,000 
SEJ 
11 
Aircraft generation is a scale from 1 to 4 where 4 is the most recent 
generation of aircrafts. 
Data 
12 
Number of times the crew members have to refer to the 
abnormal/emergency procedures section of the aircraft operation 
manual during flight per 100,000 flights. 
Data 
13 
Total duration (in seconds) of the air/ground communications, per 
aircraft, for the approach and landing flight phase. 
Data 
14 
Number of errors per 1e6 flights. A distribution is fitted to data 
provided by DNV on average number of human errors per million 
flights and some of the percentiles of the error distribution.  
DNV FT 
 
Table 4.1 Description of variables from the Model in  
 
 
The variables represented as nodes in Error!  Reference  source  not  found. are briefly 
described in Table 4.1. The basis for the quantification of each marginal distribution is 
presented in column 3. Four variables come from data and the rest were elicited through 
structured expert judgment. Node 13 would represent a base event in DNV's Fault Trees. 
Whenever the flight crew performance is of interest in the FTs an instance of node 13 
(corrected according to the own marginal distribution as computed in the FTs) will appear in 
the CATS model.  
                                                 
2 Structured expert judgment. 
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An elicitation protocol was designed for obtaining the marginal distributions shown in Table 
4.1 and the dependence information required by the model. A total of 4 marginal 
distributions, 11 questions for retrieving the dependence information and 8 calibration 
variables were asked to each expert3. Summary results from the classical method are 
presented in table. Calculations are performed with the EXCALBIUR software developed at 
the TU Delft. 
 
Results of scoring experts and Relative Information to the DM 
 Bayesian Updates: no      Weights:  global     DM Optimization:  yes  
 Significance Level:      0.6638    Calibration Power:           1 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
_____________ 
Id     |Calibr.    |Mean relati|Mean relati|Numb|UnNormalize|Normaliz.we|Normaliz.we| 
       |           | total     |realizatioo|real|weight     |without DM |with DM    | 
_______|___________|___________|___________|____|___________|___________|___________| 
C      |   0.001547|      1.016|     0.9689|   8|          0|          0|          0| 
A      |    0.02651|     0.7119|     0.4991|   8|          0|          0|          0| 
D      |      0.185|      1.317|      1.029|   8|          0|          0|          0| 
B      |     0.6638|       0.95|      0.574|   8|      0.381|          1|        0.5| 
E      | 5.115E-005|      1.049|       1.06|   8|          0|          0|          0| 
GWDM   |     0.6638|       0.95|      0.574|   8|      0.381|           |        0.5| 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                         (c) 1989-2005 TU Delft 
 
Table 4.2. Expert’s and GW Decision Maker’s Performance. 
 
Table 4.2 shows the resulting scores for the five experts in this study. The first column gives 
the expert's id; the second column gives the calibration score. The ratio of highest to lowest 
score is about 1.30E+04. It will be noted that experts B and D had a score corresponding to a 
p‐value above 5%. Scores of Experts E and C are marginal and for expert A it is rather low. 
Calibration scores in the order 0.001 would fail to confer the requisite level of confidence in 
the results. 
 
The information scores for all items and for calibrations items are shown in columns 3 and 4 
respectively. It will be noted that the overall information scores are quite similar, within a 
factor 2. In this case the expert with the best calibration score (B) also has one of the lowest 
information scores for the calibration variables which is a recurrent pattern. Weights are 
constructed by the product of columns 2 and 4. If these weights were normalized and used 
to form weighted combinations, experts A, D and B would be influential with (2.25, 32.49 
and 64.98 per cent respectively). 
 
Table 4.2 also shows that the optimized decision maker gives all weight to expert B. The 
calibration score of the GWDM is about 3 times higher than the EWDM and the information 
score is about 9 times higher over all variables and 5.7 times higher in calibration questions 
alone. The recommended choice for the DM is the GWDM as it achieves better performance 
than the EWDM and the GWDM without optimization combinations.  
                                                 
3 In total 14 rank correlations are required, however r10,6 and r10,7|6 where chosen such that r10,6 and r10,7 
would be equal, positive and as large as possible. r13, 14| 10, 12, 8, 9, 11 was elicited later from a single expert 
who is not a pilot but rather a risk analyst at NLR. Later versions of the model will incorporate more 
experts. 
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To elicit the rank correlations a total of 11 questions were asked to each expert. These were 
similar to those in relation (A2.1) in Appendix 2. Previously it was observed that the global 
weight decision maker gave weight 1 to expert B and hence no combination was necessary. 
The results of the dependence elicitation are presented in table 4.3. 
 
 
Rank 
Correlation 
Value  Rank 
Correlation 
Value 
r7,1 ‐0.95 r10,7|6 1
r7,3|1 0.86 r14,10 0.3
r7,2|1,3 0.24 r14,11|10 ‐0.32
r6,5 ‐0.95 r14,8|10,11 0.46
r6,3|5 0.86 r14,12|10,11,8 0.18
r6,4|5,3 0.24 r14,9|10,11,8,12 0.19
r10,6 0.71 r13,14|10,11,8,12,9 0.16
Table 4.3. GWDM Dependence Information
 
4.2 The ATC performance model. 
 
 
 
The Air Traffic Control Performance model (ATCP) is the second one of the generic models 
that has been developed by EWI‐NLR to represent dependence between base events in the 
FTs of the CATS model. The model is presented more extensively in [ 31]. This section is 
devoted to the description of the model and results from the expert elicitation. The model is 
shown in figure 4.2 and the variables taken into account are briefly described below (table 
4.4) according to their labeling in figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 BBN representing the ATC performance Model 
 
Node #  Definition 
Marginal 
distribution 
source 
1 Number of aircraft (any type)   simultaneously under control. Data 
2 
Four states variable. From 1‐ using radio only to 4‐using radio, 
primary and secondary radar and additional tools. 
Data 
3 
Two states. 1 ‐ The communication with other ATCos takes place in 
the same room, 2 ‐ The communication with other ATCos does not 
take place in the same room. 
Data 
4 Number of years working as an ATCo in the same position. Data 
5 
Five states variable. From 1 ‐ normal operations to operations 
below 200 meters visibility. 
Data 
6 
Total duration (in seconds) of the air/ground communications, per 
aircraft, for the approach and landing flight phase. 
Data 
7 
Number of errors per 1e6 flights. A distribution is fitted to data 
provided by DNV on average number of human errors per million 
flights and some of the percentiles of the error distribution.  
DNV FT 
 
Table 4.4 Description of variables from the ATC Model 
 
The basis for the quantification of each marginal distribution is presented in column 3. Five 
variables come from data and the error distribution from the quantification of FTs. Node 6 
would represent a base event in the Fault Trees. Whenever the ATC performance is of 
interest in the FTs an instance of node 6 (corrected according to the own marginal 
distribution as computed in the FTs) will appear in the CATS model. 
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An elicitation protocol was designed for obtaining the dependence information required by 
the model shown in figure 4.2. A total of 5 questions for retrieving the dependence 
information and 12 calibration variables were asked to 6 experts4. Estimates of one expert 
could not be used because of inconsistent estimates (ratios outside the allowable range). 
Summary results from the classical method are presented in table 5. Calculations are 
performed with the EXCALIBUR software developed at the TU Delft.  
 
 
Results of scoring experts and Relative Information to the DM 
 Bayesian Updates: no      Weights:  global     DM Optimisation:  yes  
 Significance Level:     0.00131    Calibration Power:           1 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________ 
| Id     |Calibr.    |Mean relati|Mean relati|Numb|UnNormalize|Normaliz.we|Normaliz.we| 
|        |           | total     |realizatioo|real|weight     |without DM |with DM    | 
|________|___________|___________|___________|____|___________|___________|___________| 
|A       |     0.1012|     0.5633|     0.5034|  10|    0.05095|     0.5208|     0.2015| 
|B       |    0.04706|       1.03|     0.9588|  10|    0.04512|     0.4612|     0.1784| 
|C       |    0.00131|      1.423|      1.349|  10|   0.001767|    0.01806|   0.006987| 
|D       | 2.795E-009|      1.669|      1.655|  10|          0|          0|          0| 
|E       | 2.501E-006|      1.017|     0.9624|  10|          0|          0|          0| 
|GWDM    |     0.6827|     0.3094|     0.2271|  10|     0.1551|           |     0.6131| 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
______________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                         (c) 1989-2005 TU Delft 
 
Table 4.5. Expert’s and GW Decision Maker’s Performance. 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 shows the resulting scores for the five experts in this study plus one Decision 
Maker. The first column gives the expert's id; the second column gives the calibration score. 
The ratio of highest to lowest score among the 5 experts is about 3.62E+07 (1.30E+04 in the 
case of the FCP model experts). Only expert A had a score corresponding to a p‐value above 
5%. Scores of Experts D and E are marginal and for expert C is low. 
 
The information scores for all items and for calibrations items are shown in columns 3 and 4 
respectively. It will be noted that the overall information scores are quite similar, within a 
factor 3. In this case (as in the FCP model) the expert with the best calibration score (A) also 
has the lowest information scores.  The sixth column gives the “un‐normlaized weights”; this 
is the product of columns 2 and 4. If this column were normalized (among the experts) and 
used to form weighted combinations, experts A, B and C would be influential with (52.07, 
46.11 and 1.80 per cent respectively) In Table. The equal weight decision maker (EWDM) is 
better calibrated than each expert individually. However information scores derived from 
the EWDM are poor. They are the lowest amongst all experts (that is including the EWDM as 
an expert) in both all variables and calibration questions alone. 
 
                                                 
4 All experts are ATC controllers and hence different from those participating in the FCPM. Only 10 
calibration variables could be used for the combination because of lack of response from some experts. 
r7,6| 1, 2,3 4 5 was elicited later from a single expert who is not an ATC but rather a risk analyst at NLR. Later 
versions of the model will incorporate more experts. 
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For the GWDM all experts with a calibration score less than the significance level (0.00131) 
found by the optimization procedure are outweighed as reflected by the zeros in columns 6, 
7 and 8. After the optimization procedure is applied, 3 experts have non‐zero weight. One 
can see that the calibration score of the GWDM is about 5.5 times higher than the EWDM. 
The information scores are comparable for both decision makers in both all variables and 
calibration variables alone. The calibration score of the GWDM is about 2.8 times larger 
than the item weights decision maker IWDM. The IWDM is slightly more informative than 
the GWDM. However the gain in information is not a sufficient argument to justify a 
preference of the IWDM over the GWDM. The recommended choice of the decision maker 
is the global weight decision maker as it achieves better performance than the equal weight 
and item weight combinations. Future analysis will be performed based on the GWDM. 
 
As stated before, to elicit the rank correlations in figure 4.2 a total of 6 questions were 
asked to each expert. Experts were asked to rank each variable according to the largest 
unconditional rank correlation with ATC error in absolute value5. Then for the variable 
which they regarded as having the largest rank correlation in absolute value, experts would 
assess the usual probability of exceedence. Finally ratios of each of the remaining rank 
correlations to the one assessed through a probability of exceedence were asked. This 
method is described in Appendix 2 and relation (A2.3). The combination of the three 
expert's individual assessments was done as described in AND [ 16]. The results of the 
combination scheme are presented in table 4.6 bellow. 
 
 
Probability6 (Un)conditional rank correlation 
P1 0.48 r7,4|1,2,3 ‐0.060 
P2 0.44 r7,1 ‐0.179 
P3 0.47 r7,2|1 ‐0.210 
P4 0.58 r7,3|1, 2 0.180 
P5 0.52 r7,5|1, 2, 3, 4 0.020 
‐  ‐ r7,6|1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0.180 
Table 4.6. GWDM Dependence Information for the 
ATC model 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The ranking for each expert could be different, however once the full correlation matrix of each expert is 
determined any probabilistic statement may be computed. 
6 P  = P(ATC error ≥ median | Experience ≥ median), P  = P(ATC error ≥ median | Traffic ≥ median), P1 2 1 = 
P(ATC error ≥ median | MMI ≥ 4), P  = P(ATC error ≥ median | Communication & Coordination = 2), P1 1 = 
P(ATC error ≥ median | Visibility Procedure ≥2). r7,6| 1, 2,3 4 5 was elicited later from a single expert who is 
not an ATC but rather a risk analyst at NLR. Later versions of the model will incorporate more experts. 
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4.3 The maintenance crew performance model. 
 
The Air Traffic Control Performance model (ATCP) is the third and last of the generic models 
that have been developed by the EWI‐NLR to represent dependence between base events 
in the FTs of the CATS model. A preliminary version of the model presented here may be 
found in (Jagielska, 2007). The model is shown in figure 4.3 and the variables taken into 
account are briefly described below (table 4.7) according to their labeling in figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
7
r7,2
r7,3|2
r7,6|2,3
r7,5|2,3,6
r7,4|2,3,6,5
6
r7,1|2,3,6,5,4
 
 
Figure 4.3 BBN representing the maintenance crew performance Model 
 
 
Unlike the previous two models, only one expert was readily available for the quantification 
of the model7. The meeting with this single expert, who is a maintenance engineer for NLR, 
took place on May the 28th 2008. The expert was asked 21 questions in total, where 7 
questions were used to assign marginal distributions and 11 to elicit calibration variables. 
The rest were used to obtain the rank and conditional rank correlations required (Figure 5). 
The expert was asked to specify his 5%, 50% and 95% quantile of his uncertainty distribution 
for each variable of interest. Since a single expert was used, no combination was required. 
The results of the dependence elicitation are shown in table 4.8.  
 
                                                 
7 It is desirable to have more experts quantifying the model for CATS II. 
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Node #  Definition 
Marginal 
distribution 
source 
1 
Whether the work is performed at the ramp (outside ‐ 1) or in the 
hangar (inside ‐ 2) 
SEJ 
2 
Stanford sleepiness scale, where 1 is feeling active, vital, alert or 
wide awake and 7 is no longer fighting sleep; having dream‐like 
thoughts 
SEJ 
3 Years in current position Data 
4 Time available to transfer a job (min) SEJ 
5 
Aircraft generation is a scale from 1 to 4 where 4 is the most recent 
generation of aircrafts. 
Data 
6 Estimated delay in release of the aircraft (hrs) SEJ 
7 
Number of errors per demand. A distribution is fitted to data 
provided by DNV on average number of human errors per million 
flights and some of the percentiles of the error distribution.  
DNV FT 
 
Table 4.7 Description of variables from the maintenance crew performance model 
 
 
 
 
Probability8 (Un)conditional rank correlation 
P1 0.7 r7,2 0.23 
P2 0.423 r7,3|2 ‐0.24 
P3 0.538 r7,6|2,3 0.12 
P4 0.435 r7,5|2,3,6 ‐0.07 
P5 0.477 r7,4|2,3,6,5 ‐0.07 
P6 0.48 r7,1| 2, 3, 6, 5, 4 ‐0.02 
Table 4.8. Dependence Information for the 
Maintenance model 
 
                                                 
8 P1 = P(MNT Error > median | Fatigue > 4), P2 = P(MNT Error > median | Experience > median), 
P  = P(MNT Error > median | Workload > median), P3 4 = P(MNT Error > median |Aircraft generation = 4), 
P5 = P(MT Error > median |Shift overlap time > median),  
P  = P(MNT Error > median | Working condition = 1) 6
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5. The CATS Bayesian belief net. 
 
 
As previously mentioned, the CATS model integrates ESDs, FTs, and BBN into one single 
continuous‐discrete BBN. This section is devoted to a description of the procedure to build 
up the CATS model. The three models presented in sections 4.1 – 4.3 are represented for 3 
different flight phases; these are Take Off (TO) En‐Route (ER) and Approach & Landing (AL). 
In cite DNV these flight phases are considered for building up the FTs that are attached to 
the ESDs. The definitions of flight phases used here are equal to those in cite DNV.  
 
 
5.1 ESDs and FTs for the CATS model 
 
 
The quantification of ESDs is presented in [ 18], this is used in [ 32] to quantify the FTs that 
later compute the accident probability. The FTs (and consequently ESDs) presented in [ 32] 
are translated into functional nodes as explained in section 2.7.  
 
In figure 5.1 one may see ESD1 aircraft system failure for the TO flight phase. In total four 
AND gates and four OR gates represent the FT and ESD. Fifteen base events are influenced 
by the maintenance performance model presented in section 4.3 and 3 base events by the 
flight crew performance model from subsection 4.1. No influence of the ATC performance 
model is observed in this particular FT. To translate this information into a BBN the process 
is: 
 
• Find a distribution of the probability of base events per demand according to their 
variability (see next section) 
• Connect underneath the corresponding dependence model from subsections 4.1‐4.3 
with the corresponding dependence info. These nodes will be ancestors of base 
events in the Fault Trees 
• Write down in descendent nodes of each base event the arithmetic formulas that 
translate a FT into a BBN (subsection 2.7). These will be functional nodes in the BBN 
 
These steps are repeated for all 31 ESDs presented in table 5.1 
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END EVENT EVENT CODE PROBABILITY 
FREQUENCY (per 
flight)
TO01a1 TO01b1 TO01c1
Aircraft System 
Failure
Flight crew rejects 
take-off V>V1 Runway overrun TO01d1-01 2.57E-04 7.50E-09
2.92E-05 0.590 4.35E-04
TO01d2
Failure to achieve 
maximum braking Runway overrun TO01e1-02 8.67E-05 2.53E-09
1.47E-04
Yes
 No
Aircraft stops on 
runway TO01e2-03 5.90E-01 1.72E-05
Aircraft continues 
take-off TO01b2-04 4.10E-01 1.20E-05
Total 1.00 2.92E-05
 TO01a1  TO01b1
TO01d2
Take-off Rejected
5.90E-01
per take-off with A/C 
system failure
Contribution 1.000
TO01B21 TO01B22
Take-off rejected 
incorrectly when 
above V1
Take-off rejected 
correctly when below 
V1
2.57E-04 5.90E-01
per take-off with A/C 
system failure
per take-off with A/C 
system failure
Contribution 0.747 Contribution 0.253
TO01B211 TO01B212
Pilot Misdiagnosis Pilot Misjudgement
1.28E-04 1.28E-04
per take-off with A/C 
system failure
per take-off with A/C 
system failure
Contribution 0.374 Contribution 0.374
OR
 TO01b1
OR
Failure to achieve 
maximum braking
1.47E-04
per take-off rejection 
with A/C system 
failure
Contribution 0.253
TO01B31 TO01B32 TO01B33
Insufficient Runway 
Length
Brakes not 
functioning correctly
Brakes not applied 
correctly
1.23E-04 1.23E-05 1.23E-05
per take-off rejection 
with A/C system 
failure
per take-off rejection 
with A/C system 
failure
per take-off rejection 
with A/C system 
failure
Contribution 0.211 Contribution 0.021 Contribution 0.021
OR
TO01d2
Aircraft systems 
failure
2.92E-05
per take-off
Contribution 1.000
TO01B11 TO01B12 TO01B13 TO01B14 TO01B15 TO01B16 TO01B17 TO01B18 TO01B19 TO01B110 TO01B111 TO01B112 TO01B113 TO01B114
Autoflight Failure Communications 
Failure
Electrical Power 
Failure
Fire Protection Failure Hydraulic Power 
Failure
Indicating and 
Recording System 
Failure
Navigation System 
Failure
Auxiliary Power Unit 
Failure
Flap Systems Failure Drag Control Systems 
Failure
Landing Gear 
Systems Failure
Pneumatic Systems 
Failure
Door Systems Failure Other Systems 
Failures
4.71E-07 1.27E-07 3.02E-06 4.30E-07 1.55E-06 1.22E-06 4.00E-06 3.02E-07 1.48E-06 1.18E-06 3.07E-06 8.61E-07 5.01E-06 6.48E-06
per take-off per take-off per take-off per take-off per take-off per take-off per take-off per take-off per take-off per take-off per take-off per take-off per take-off per take-off
Contribution 0.016 Contribution 0.004 Contribution 0.103 Contribution 0.015 Contribution 0.053 Contribution 0.042 Contribution 0.137 Contribution 0.010 Contribution 0.051 Contribution 0.040 Contribution 0.105 Contribution 0.029 Contribution 0.172 Contribution 0.222
ATA 2200 ATA 2300 ATA 2400 ATA 2600 ATA 2900 ATA 3100 ATA 3400 ATA 4900 ATA 2750 - 2752 ATA 2760 - 2761 ATA 3200-3243,3246,3252-3297 ATA 3600-3697 ATA 5200-5297
TO01a1
OR
AND Gate OR Gate MNT model FC model 
 
 
Figure 5.1 ESD1 Aircraft system failure and its corresponding FT showing. 
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ESD Initiating event 
1 Aircraft system failure 
2 ATC event 
3 Aircraft handling by flight crew inappropriate 
4 Aircraft directional control related systems failure 
5 Operation of aircraft systems by flight crew inappropriate 
6 Aircraft takes off with contaminated wing 
7 Aircraft weight and balance outside limits 
8 Aircraft encounters performance decreasing windshear after rotation  
9 Single engine failure 
10 Pitch control problem 
11 Fire on board aircraft 
12 Flight crew member spatially disorientated 
13 Flight control system failure 
14 Flight crew incapacitation 
15 Anti‐ice system not operating 
16 Flight instrument failure 
17 Aircraft encounters adverse weather 
18 Single engine failure 
19 Unstable approach 
21 Aircraft weight and balance outside limits 
23 Aircraft encounters windshear during approach/landing 
25 Aircraft handling by flight crew during flare inappropriate 
26 Aircraft handling by flight crew during roll inappropriate 
27 Aircraft direction control related systems failure 
28 Single engine failure 
29 Thrust reverser failure 
30 Aircraft encounters unexpected wind 
31 Aircraft are positioned on collision course 
32 Incorrect presence of aircraft/vehicle on runway in use 
33 Cracks in aircraft pressure cabin 
35 Flight crew decision error/operation of equipment error 
 
Table 5.1. Thirty one ESDs represented in the current version of the CATS 
model  
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5.2 The error distributions 
 
 
Base events in the FTs are influenced by the human performance models presented in 
section 4. In fact, the probabilities presented in DNV’s FTs represent the expected 
probability of a given human error9. Other percentiles over the distribution of error 
probability are also given by DNV.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Percentiles of the FT’s base event probability distribution from DNV 
 
Figure 5.2 says that the minimum value that the base event probability TO01B11 is 
0*E(TO01B11)=0 where E(X) denotes the expectation of X. In the same way the maximum 
value of TO01B11 should be equal to 129.599*E(TO01B11). Other quantiles may be read in 
the same way. This information is used to fit a parametric distribution to this data to 
represent the distribution over the base event probability. In total there are 743 basic 
events considered over all thirty one ESDs from table 5.1 in the model as is presented in 
Figure 1.1. 
 
                                                 
9 There might be events which do not represent a human error but rather something else going wrong in 
the aviation system. 
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With these percentiles a minimally informative distribution with respect to the log uniform 
measure may be found. This distribution will always comply with the percentiles provided 
by DNV, however, it was decided that a parametric distribution would be fit to the data 
provided by DNV. A parametric distribution is desired for the following reasons: 
 
• The model  is  easier  to maintain. The minimally informative distribution requires 
storing the whole distribution while a parametric distribution would require storing 
only a number of parameters to completely describe the distribution. 
 
• The minimally informative solution fitted to the quantiles shown in Figure 6 will not 
in general preserve the expectation provided by DNV. 
 
• The model was required to have the functionality that by specifying a mean different 
than  the  one  computed  by  DNV  and  keeping  the  variance  constant,  a  new 
distribution could be obtained. 
 
The fitting procedure to obtain the parametric distribution for each base event is described 
briefly next: 
 
• Obtain the minimally informative distribution (with respect to log uniform 
background measure to avoid negative values) that fits this information. As stated 
previously, this distribution is a distribution over the probability of error. Observe 
that the minimally informative solution will always capture the percentiles specified 
by DNV, however, still might give inconsistent results. For example, part of the 
distribution may be outside the (0,1) interval and this distribution will not have in 
general the expectation provided by DNV as the probability of base events in the FTs. 
For this reasons we then,  
• Find the parameters of a Weibull, Gamma, Log‐normal or beta distribution that 
minimizes the sum of squared difference between the minimally informative 
solution found in step 1 and the parametric distribution such that,  
? The expectation of the parametric distribution is equal to DNVs estimate,  
? The distribution lies in the interval (0,1) and, 
? The 0.9999999999999999 percentile of the distribution is less or equal than 
the maximum value provided by DNV. 
 
 
The procedure described above was applied in a first pass to ESD1, ESD26 and ESD19. 
Naturally, the results of the fitting procedure vary widely across base events. In general 
it was observed that Weibull and Gamma characterized better the data provided by 
DNV and at the end to improve speed the procedure described above was applied 
searching for Gamma and Weibull parameters only to the 743 base events provided by 
DNV.  
 
Where no convergence was possible, a search on Beta and LogNormal parameters was 
also implemented. In general, since the mean and maximum value of DNVs data entered 
as constraints in the optimization procedure described above they are well captured by 
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the fitted distributions. However some fits may still be far from DNVs quintile data. Two 
examples are presented in figures 5.3 and 5.4 for illustration purposes only. In both 
cases the Weibull distribution was minimum in terms of the sum of squared difference. 
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Figure 5.3 Different fits to the percentiles of the FTs base event probability distribution 
from DNV for the base event TO01B211 
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Figure 5.4 Different fits to the percentiles of the FTs base event probability distribution 
from DNV for the base event TO02B11212 
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5.2 Building up the model 
 
 
 
Once a distribution for each of the 743 base events of interest has been found, the next step 
is to attach the adequate dependence information between base events. From figure 5.1 it 
may be observed that each base event represents an instance of one of the three human 
reliability models from chapter 4.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 ESD1 with one instance of the FC performance model. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 shows ESD1 with a single instance of the FC performance model from section 4.1. 
Since according to figure 5.1 there are in total three base events in ESD1 influenced by the 
flight crew performance, then when including the remaining two FC base events the model 
should look as in figure 5.6 
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Figure 5.6 ESD1 with three instance of the FC performance model. 
 
 
Also from figure 5.1 it may be observed that the FC performance model is not the only one 
influencing basic events in ESD1. The fifteen base events influenced by the maintenance 
crew performance model should also be included in the BBN representation of ESD1. The 
complete representation of ESD1 is shown in figure 5.6 
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Figure 5.6 BBN representation of figure 5.1 with human reliability models expressing non‐
independence of base events in the FTs. 
 
  
 
Figure 5.7 BBN representation of figure ESD1 and ESD2 with human reliability models 
expressing non‐independence of base events in the FTs. 
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If the same process is repeated for ESD2 the model should look as in figure 7. This process 
has to be repeated for the 31 ESDs from table 5.1. The reader should observe that some 
nodes change through flight phases and some do not. For example, experience in the ATC 
anf FC models is consider not to change across flight phases. On the other hand the FC 
model would have one instance of weather per flight phase. A complete list of the variables 
as entered in UniNet may is presented in Appendix 3. 
 
 
Total Transmission Time Aircraft Generation
 
 
Figure 5.8 One instance of each of the ATC, FC and MNT performance models in the 
Approach and Landing flight phases. 
 
 
In the CATS model the flight crew performance model and the ATC performance model 
share in common the total transmission time in the AL flight phase. The maintenance model 
and the flight crew model share the aircraft generation node in all  flight phases. This 
situation is summarized in figure 5.8 
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EEMCS‐TU Delft
5.3 The complete model 
 
 
The complete CATS model is presented in figures 5.9 and 2.2 at the beginning of this report. 
The model has been integrated with the methods described in this report and the 
references at the end of the document. The model, at the date of publication of this 
document, consists of 834 probabilistic nodes, 532 functional and 4,756 arcs.  
 
FC model in TO
FC model in ER
FC model in AL
MNT model TO ER AL
ATC model in TO
ATC model in ER
ATC model in AL
Common nodes for the FC all flight phases
 
 
Figure 5.9 BBN representing the CATS model with human reliability models in different 
flight phases attached to the base events. 
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Appendices. 
Appendix 1. Summary list of EWI products related 
to the CATS project 
 
 
 
Documents: 
 
• Report on phase 1 CATS 
• Report on phase 2 CATS 
• Report on phase 3 CATS 
• Report on phase 4 CATS 
• Report on phase 5 CATS 
• Report on phase 6 CATS 
• Description of the Expert elicitation Results for the Flight Crew Performance Model 
• Description of the Expert elicitation Results for the ATC Performance Model 
• System level Risk Analysis of new Merging and Spacing Protocols.  
• Aviation Risks with continuous‐discrete distribution free BBNs (Master Thesis) 
Katarzyna Agata Krugla 
• Quantification of non‐parametric continuous BBNs with ex‐pert judgment (Master 
Thesis) I.D. Jagielska. 
 
 
Software: 
 
• UniNet (Continuous BBNs) 
• UniExp (Elicitation of Rank and Conditional Rank Correlations) 
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Appendix 2. Elicitation procedures for rank and 
conditional rank correlations  
 
Two types of methods for the elicitation of dependence measures will be briefly discussed. 
For a morge general overview on elicitation procedures for rank and unconditional rank 
correlations the reader is referred to [ 15] and [ 16]. Examples of the two methods will be 
discussed with the BBN in figure A2‐1. The six marginal distributions (one required for each 
node) may be computed from data from separate sources or with the classical model for 
expert judgment [ 9]. Variables X1 to X5 are independent of each other. Four conditional 
rank correlations and one unconditional rank correlation are required. 
 
 
 
Figure A2-1 BBN on 6 Nodes 
 
 
• Probabilistic Approaches: Experts are queried probability statements such as a joint 
probability, a conditional probability or a probability of concordance. By making 
assumptions about the joint distribution the assessments can later be translated to 
a rank correlation. Denote  the rank correlation between Xier 1,6 6 and X1 for expert i = 
1,...,N. Similarly the conditional rank correlation between X6 and X2 given X1 will be 
denoted as  for expert eier 1|2,6 i. All other (un)conditional rank correlations in the BBN 
will be denoted similarly. The median value of variable Xj for expert ei is denoted 
as . Similarly the kiejx 50,
th percentile of variable Xj is denoted as . The cumulative i
e
kjx ,
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distribution function for variable Xj from expert ei will be denoted as . The 
required questions for figure A2‐1 could be: 
i
j
e
xF
 ( )( )5.0)(|5.0)( | 16 11661 16 >>=
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(A2.1)
( )( )5.0)(,5.0)(,5.0)(,5.0)(,5.0)(|5.0)( ,,,,| 543216 5544332211665 543216 >>>>>>=
>>>>>>=
XFXFXFXFXFXFP
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X
eeeeeee
 
 
Notice that the recommended choice for the percentile used in the probabilities 
stated in relation (A2.1) is the median; however any other percentile  may be 
used. In particular other percentiles are necessary for discrete variables. Notice also 
that as stated before other probabilistic statements could be elicited in relation 
(A2.1) according to the analysts preference. For example shorter conditioning sets 
might be considered. Another option would be to elicit joint distributions instead of 
conditional probabilities of exceedance. 
ie
kjx ,
 
Once estimates as in relation (A2.1) are available to the analyst, the corresponding 
(un)conditional rank correlations may be computed for each expert (relation(A2.2)). 
In [ 15] a more extensive discussion about relation (A2.2) is provided. 
 
 
ii ee rP 1,61 →  
ii ee rP 1|2,62 →  
ii ee rP 2,1|3,63 →  (A2.2)
ii ee rP 3,2,1|4,64 →  
ii ee rP 4,3,2,1|5,65 →  
 
 
• Statistical Approach: Another option is to let experts directly assess a rank 
correlation. In particular we could let experts rank variables X1,...,X5 according to the 
one which they regard has the largest rank correlation (in absolute value) with X6. 
For each expert, the variable with the largest rank correlation (in absolute value) 
with X6 will be renamed as V1. The second largest V2 and so on until the smallest V5. 
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This ranking will in general be different for each expert. Experts could then be 
queried the following questions: 
 
 ( )iii eee vVxXPP 11661 | >>=  
iii e
V
e
V
e rrR
12 ,6,62
=  
iii e
V
e
V
e rrR
13 ,6,63
=  (A2.3)
iii e
V
e
V
e rrR
14 ,6,64
=  
iii e
V
e
V
e rrR
15 ,6,65
=  
 
 
 
The largest rank correlation is still elicited through a probabilistic statement.  in 
relation (A2.3) denotes the ratio of the second largest rank correlation to the largest 
rank correlation (in absolute value) for expert e
ieR2
i. Similar notation is applied for other 
ratios. As before, the recommended choice for the percentile used in  in relation 
(A2.3) is the median, however any other percentile  or  may be used. As 
stated before, other probabilistic statements could be elicited for  in relation 
(A2.3) according to the analyst's preference. 
ieP1
ie
kjx , i
e
kjv ,
ieP1
 
 
ii ee rP 1,61 →  
ii ee rP 1|2,62 →  
ii ee rP 2,1|3,63 →  (A2.4)
ii ee rP 3,2,1|4,64 →  
ii ee rP 4,3,2,1|5,65 →  
 
 
Once estimates in relation (A2.3) are available, the desired estimates could be 
computed for each expert. The computation of the required (un)conditional rank 
correlations in relation (A2.4) follows the same arguments as before [ 15] [ 16]. 
 
 
One argument in favor of the elicitation of probabilistic statements is that their elicitation 
has proven to be feasible in previous studies [ 14] and [ 15] with real applications. Experts 
seem to be familiar with the elicitation of conditional probabilities. However, when the 
number of conditioning variables is large (as in relation (A2.1)) experts tend to object the 
elicitation of probabilities. As mentioned previously this could be avoided by eliciting 
conditional probabilities with smaller number of conditioning variables. 
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The second method presented previously, combines the elicitation of one probabilistic 
statement with ratios of unconditional rank correlations. The advantage of this method is 
that experts may express somewhat easier the “relative strength” of each unconditional 
rank correlation (in the correlation matrix) as expressed by its absolute value. Once the 
correlation matrix is available for each expert any probabilistic statement may be computed 
(given the normal copula assumption) for each expert's estimates. The issue of combining 
their opinions arises once estimates from each expert are available. The combination of 
experts’ dependence estimates is discussed in [ 16] and will not be addressed here. 
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Appendix 3. Human reliability model nodes 
entered in the complete CATS model 
 
 
ParameterCode DisplayName ParameterDescription 
zATC_ALCoord ATC Coordination 
A&L 
Communtication/Coordination     1‐does not 
take place in the same room    2‐takes place in 
the same room  (Approach Landing) 
zATC_ALExpATCO ATC ATCO Experience 
A&L 
Number of years working as an ATCo at 
current position (Approach Landing) 
zATC_ALInterface ATC Interface A&L 1‐Radio only   2‐Radio and Primary Radar   3‐
radio, primary and secondary radar    4‐radio, 
primary, secondary and additional tools (e.g. 
A‐SMGCS,STCA) (Approach Landing) 
zATC_ALTraffic ATC Traffic A&L Number of aircraft simultaneously under 
control by ATCo (Approach &  Landing) 
zATC_ALVisProc ATC Visual Procedure 
at A&L 
1‐Normal operations    2‐Operating under BZO 
A   3‐Operating under BZO B    4‐Operating 
under BZO C   5‐Operating under BZO D 
(Approach Landing) 
zATC_ERCoord ATC Coordination En 
route 
Communtication/Coordination     1‐does not 
take place in the same room    2‐takes place in 
the same room   (Take Off) 
zATC_ERExpATCO ATC ATCO Experience 
En route 
Number of years working as an ATCo at 
current position (Take Off) 
zATC_ERInterface ATC Interface En 
route 
1‐Radio only   2‐Radio and Primary Radar   3‐
radio, primary and secondary radar    4‐radio, 
primary, secondary and additional tools (e.g. 
A‐SMGCS,STCA) (Take Off) 
zATC_ERTraffic ATC Traffic En route Number of aircraft simultaneously under 
control by ATCo (Take Off) 
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zATC_ERVisProc ATC Visual 
procedures En route 
1‐Normal operations    2‐Operating under BZO 
A   3‐Operating under BZO B    4‐Operating 
under BZO C   5‐Operating under BZO D (Take 
Off) 
zATC_TOCoord ATC Coordination at 
take‐off 
Communtication/Coordination     1‐does not 
take place in the same room    2‐takes place in 
the same room   (Take Off) 
zATC_TOExpATCO ATC ATCO Experience 
at take‐off 
Number of years working as an ATCo at 
current position (Take Off) 
zATC_TOInterface ATC Interface at take‐
off 
1‐Radio only   2‐Radio and Primary Radar   3‐
radio, primary and secondary radar    4‐radio, 
primary, secondary and additional tools (e.g. 
A‐SMGCS,STCA) (Take Off) 
zATC_TOTraffic ATC Traffic at take‐off Number of aircraft simultaneously under 
control by ATCo (Take Off) 
zATC_TOVisProc ATC Visual Procedure 
at take‐off 
1‐Normal operations    2‐Operating under BZO 
A   3‐Operating under BZO B    4‐Operating 
under BZO C   5‐Operating under BZO D (Take 
Off) 
zFCATC_ERALTotTransTime Total air/ground 
comms time 
The Total Transmission Time, i.e. the total 
duration (in seconds) of the air/ground 
communications, per aircraft 
zFC_ALFatigue Flight crew Fatigue at 
A&L 
Stanford Sleepiness Scale 1 completely awake 
to 7 sleep onset soon (Approach‐Landing) 
zFC_ALUnSuitCap Flight Crew Captain 
Unsuitability A&L 
Number of Captains failing their proficiency 
check test per 10,000 Captains (Approach‐
Landing) 
zFC_ALUnSuitCrew Flight Crew 
Unsuitability A&L 
Number of Captains or/and First Officers 
failing their proficiency check test per 10,000 
Captains or/and First Officers (Approach‐
Landing) 
zFC_ALUnSuitFO Flight Crew FO 
Unsuitability A&L 
Number of First Officers failing their 
proficiency check test per 10,000 First Officers 
(Approach‐Landing) 
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zFC_ALWeather Weather at cockpit 
A&L 
Rainfall rate (mm/hr)  translated into airborne 
weather radar in a cockpit at (Approach‐
Landing) 
zFC_ALWorkload Flight Crew Workload 
A&L 
Number of times the crew members 
encounter an abnormal/emergency situation 
per 100,000 flights  (Approach‐Landing) 
zFC_ERFatigue Flight crew Fatigue En 
route 
Stanford Sleepiness Scale 1 completely awake 
to 7 sleep onset soon (En‐Route) 
zFC_ERUnSuitCap Flight Crew Captain 
Unsuitability En route 
Number of Captains failing their proficiency 
check test per 10,000 Captains (En‐Route) 
zFC_ERUnSuitCrew Flight Crew 
Unsuitability En route 
Number of Captains or/and First Officers 
failing their proficiency check test per 10,000 
Captains or/and First Officers (En‐Route) 
zFC_ERUnSuitFO Flight Crew FO 
Unsuitability En route 
Number of First Officers failing their 
proficiency check test per 10,000 First Officers 
(En‐Route) 
zFC_ERWeather Weather at cockpit 
En route 
Rainfall rate (mm/hr)  translated into airborne 
weather radar in a cockpit at (En‐Route) 
zFC_ERWorkload Flight Crew Workload 
En route 
Number of times the crew members 
encounter an abnormal/emergency situation 
per 100,000 flights (En‐Route) 
zFC_TOERALExpCap Flight Crew Captain 
Experience 
Total number of hours flown since the pilot's 
license obtained by captains 
zFC_TOERALExpFO Flight crew FO 
Experience 
Total number of hours flown since the pilots 
license obtained by first officers. 
zFC_TOERALTrainCap Flight crew Captain 
Training 
Number of days passed since last recurrence 
training for Captains. 
zFC_TOERALTrainFO Flight crew FO 
Training 
Number of days passed since last recurrence 
training for First Officers. 
zFC_TOFatigue Flight Crew Fatigue at 
take‐off 
Stanford Sleepiness Scale 1 completely awake 
to 7 sleep onset soon (Take Off) 
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zFC_TOUnSuitCap Flight Crew Captain 
Unsuitability at take‐
off 
Number of Captains failing their proficiency 
check test per 10,000 Captains (Take Off) 
zFC_TOUnSuitCrew Flight Crew 
Unsuitability at take‐
off 
Number of Captains or/and First Officers 
failing their proficiency check test per 10,000 
Captains or/and First Officers (Take Off) 
zFC_TOUnSuitFO Flight Crew FO 
Unsuitability at take‐
off 
Number of First Officers failing their 
proficiency check test per 10,000 First Officers 
(Take Off) 
zFC_TOWeather Weather at cockpit at 
take‐off 
Rainfall rate (mm/hr)  translated into airborne 
weather radar in a cockpit at (Take Off) 
zFC_TOWorkload Flight Crew Workload 
during take off 
Number of times the crew members 
encounter an abnormal/emergency situation 
per 100,000 flights  (Take Off) 
zFCMNT_TOERALAirGen Aircraft Generation Aircraft generation is a scale from 1 to 4 where 
4 is the most recent generation of aircrafts 
zFCTOERALLangDif Flight Crew language 
Difference 
Number of flights in which the pilot and first 
officer will have a different mother tongue per 
100,000 flights 
zMNT_TOERALCoord Maintenance Shift 
Overlap Time 
Time available to transfer a job (min) 
zMNT_TOERALExpMaint Maintenance 
Experience 
Years in current position 
zMNT_TOERALFatigue Maintenance Fatigue Stanford sleepness scale, where 1 is feeling 
active, vital, alert or wide awake and 7 is no 
longer fighting sleep; having dream‐like 
thoughts 
zMNT_TOERALWorkCond Maintenance Work 
Location 
Whether the work is performed at the ramp 
(outside ‐ 1) or in the hangar (inside ‐ 2) 
zMNT_TOERALWorkload Maintenance 
Workload 
Estimated delay in release of the aircraft (hrs) 
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Acronyms. 
 
 
 
ATC Air traffic control 
ATCo Air traffic controller 
BBN Bayesian belief net 
CATS Causal Model for Air Transport Safety 
CFIT Control flight into terrain 
DNV Det Norske Veritas 
ESD  Event Sequence Diagram 
FT Fault Tree 
NLR  National Aerospace Laboratory  
TUD Technische Universiteit Delft / Delft University of Technology  
WQ White Queen 
DIAM Delft Institute of Applied Mathematics 
EEMCS Electrical Engineering Computer Sciences and Mathematics 
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